Social Engineering Tactics: Malware-as-a-Service Fuels Scalable Mobile Threats

Author: Aarsh Jawa

In recent months, the mobile cyber threat ecosystem has witnessed a dramatic shift, largely driven by the growing popularity of Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) platforms.

Once the domain of skilled threat actors, sophisticated Android malware can now be rented by virtually anyone with a few hundred dollars and an internet connection. This democratization of malware development has not only increased the volume of mobile threats, but has also amplified their impact, powering campaigns involving fake apps, surveillance tools, and even extortion at scale.

MaaS, also known as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), operates in a similar manner to a traditional Software as a Service (SaaS) business model. Malware and Ransomware developers take on the work of developing and maintaining malicious tools and infrastructure, and then package their tools and services into MaaS and RaaS kits that they sell to other hackers, known as affiliates.

According to the IBM Cost of a Data Breach report, the average ransomware breach cost victims USD $4.91 million in 2024.

The Foundation: MaaS Platforms Lower the Barrier

Platforms like PhantomOS and Nebula exemplify how MaaS has evolved. These services allow attackers to subscribe to malware packages with features such as:

• App injection and phishing overlays (e.g., for WhatsApp, banking apps)
  
  
• Interception of SMS messages and 2FA codes
  
  
• Remote device control and location tracking
  
  
• Antivirus evasion and silent background installations
  
  

With prices starting as low as $300/month, these toolkits eliminate the need for technical skill, making it easy for inexperienced actors to orchestrate high-impact mobile attacks. MaaS platforms even provide admin panels, dashboards, and support services – essentially offering a full criminal SaaS model for mobile surveillance and fraud.

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From Toolkit to Threat: Fake Apps Built on MaaS

The downstream effect of MaaS can be seen in the proliferation of fake mobile applications, particularly those impersonating dating apps, file-sharing tools, and cloud storage platforms. These apps:

• Abusively request permissions for camera, microphone, contacts, and SMS
  
  
• Use social engineering and polished UIs to appear legitimate
  
  
• Are distributed through phishing links, smishing (SMS phishing), and third-party app stores
  
  

Many of these fake apps are built using pre-configured MaaS templates, allowing for rapid customization and deployment. Because the core malware functionality is handled by MaaS platforms, attackers can focus on branding, distribution, and targeting—turning what was once a manual, high-effort process into a scalable operation.

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Real-World Consequence: The SarangTrap Extortion Campaign

A chilling example of this model in action is the SarangTrap campaign, uncovered by Zimperium. This campaign involved:

• Over 250 fake Android dating apps
  
  
• Distributed across 80+ malicious domains
  
  
• Specifically targeting users in South Korea
  
  

Once installed, these apps harvested photos, contacts, and chat logs. Victims were then extorted: the attackers threatened to leak their personal data or intimate conversations unless a ransom was paid.

The technical underpinnings of SarangTrap – data theft, remote access, surveillance – strongly resemble features advertised by MaaS platforms. The scale, speed, and regional focus suggest not a one-off operation but a commercial campaign, likely built on rented malware infrastructure.

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A Streamlined Mobile Threat Supply Chain:

What ties these cases together is a clear mobile malware supply chain, now powered by MaaS:

1. MaaS Platforms (e.g., PhantomOS, Nebula)
   
   → Provide turnkey malware kits with plug-and-play features.
   
   
2. Fake App Campaigns
   
   → Use MaaS malware to create convincing fake APKs for distribution.
   
   
3. Extortion & Credential Theft Campaigns (e.g., SarangTrap)
   
   → Deploy those apps to extract data and exploit users for financial or emotional gain.
   
   

MaaS is the factory. Fake apps are the product. Campaigns like SarangTrap are the business model.

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Implications for Defenders

The convergence of MaaS with mobile campaigns presents several key challenges:

• Scalability: Threat actors can now launch widespread campaigns with minimal effort.
  
  
• Obfuscation: MaaS kits often include techniques to bypass AV, sandboxes, and behavioral detection.
  
  
• Adaptability: With subscription-based pricing, attackers can update or rotate payloads frequently.

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What used to take time, effort, and technical skill is now available “on demand.” Whether it’s launching fake apps to harvest credentials or running regional extortion operations like SarangTrap, the common denominator is the availability of MaaS platforms that arm cybercriminals with turnkey mobile surveillance and fraud kits.

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All 3 Are Linked: The MaaS Supply Chain Behind Modern Mobile Threats

• MaaS: The Infrastructure
  
  MaaS platforms like PhantomOS and Nebula offer affordable, ready-to-deploy Android malware with features like phishing overlays, 2FA interception, remote access, and AV evasion—enabling even low-skill attackers to launch sophisticated mobile campaigns.
  
  
• Fake apps: The Output
  
  Fake dating, utility, and cloud storage apps seen in the wild are often built using MaaS kits. These APKs abuse permissions, mimic legit apps, and are deployed at scale via phishing or third-party stores—something MaaS makes fast and repeatable.
  
  
• SarangTrap: The Campaign
  
  The SarangTrap extortion operation used over 250 fake dating apps across 80+ domains to harvest personal data and demand ransom. Its scale, tooling, and speed point to MaaS as the operational backbone.

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The New Mindset: Disrupting Attack Supply Chains

What we’re witnessing is the industrialization of mobile cybercrime. MaaS platforms like PhantomOS and Nebula have transformed mobile threats from isolated incidents into scalable, repeatable business models. No longer limited to elite hackers, sophisticated attacks can now be executed by virtually anyone with a credit card and a motive. Campaigns like SarangTrap are no longer outliers. Instead, they're early warnings of a world where identity theft, extortion, and digital surveillance are just a few clicks away.

For defenders, this demands a new mindset: not just detecting threats, but understanding and disrupting the supply chains that power them. When malware becomes a service, defense must become a strategy.

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See more MaaS examples below. To see how Doppel's proactive strategy stops social engineering before it does damage, book a demo.

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This screenshot below captures an underground forum post advertising PhantomOS V1, a highly advanced Android Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offering. Marketed toward elite fraud operators, this tool enables remote silent APK injection, OTP interception, phishing overlays via hidden URLs (StealthPanels), and full control of victim accounts and data.

This image below showcases a dark web advertisement promoting a private Android banking botnet known as THANOS Botnet. It’s being marketed as a premium Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) tool designed for cybercriminals conducting mobile banking fraud, phishing, and data exfiltration. It also lists capabilities that the final compiled malware (bot) has once it’s deployed on a victim’s Android device. These are the core spying and control features attackers can use after infecting the device.

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